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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOLAR SALT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
Case No. 14427
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking injunction against the
maintenance of a public nuisance, i. e. the pollution of
the Great Salt Lake, for abatement of a private nuisance
including the obstruction of the waters of Great Salt Lake
so as to cause them to back onto and flood lands Appellant
(herein called "Solar") owns or is entitled to occupy, and
for damages associated with special injury Solar has suffered
by reason of the perpetration of the nuisance.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., granted summary
judgment to Respondent (herein called the "SP").

Judgment

was granted on the pleadings; discovery related only to
the location of lands Solar claimed to own, the nature of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Solar's title, and the sources of Solar*s claimed rights
in land and water*

In essence the trial court ruled that,

even if every allegation of Solar's complaint is true,
Solar still has no status to sue, and the law of Utah
affords no remedy for Solar's injury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purposes of this proceeding, the facts
must be assumed to be as alleged in the complaint except
as Solarfs responses to interrogatories may contradict
those allegations, and we are aware of no contradictions.
The operative facts, then, are these:
1.

Before 1956, Solar made investments

in a salt extraction plant on the shores of
the Great Salt Lake and in the development of
markets for and means of transporting salt.
Its

operations in this regard represented a

multimillion dollar investment at the time the
complaint was filed.
2.

In 1959, the SP constructed a causeway

across the Great Salt Lake at a location and in
a manner which obstructed the natural flow and
movement of the lake waters.
3.

Since the causeway emplacement, there

has been a change in the chemistry of the lake
marked by migration of contained mineral salts
to the area north of the causeway (the "north lake").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The north lake brines have become supersaturated
in halite so that millions of tons have deposited
on the north lake bed and been lost to economical
harvest.

The north lake brines have become an

intolerable environment for any form of life
except a peculiar red alga.

The brine shrimp

which once proliferated in the north lake and
which constituted the only natural biological
filtering agent for the lake have been extinguished.
The red alga blooms unmetabolized, colors the water,
and makes it turbid.

Moreover, the alga, being

organic material, is subject to decay in low water
cycles.

The coelenterate life which once abounded

in the north lake (the coral-like reefs of the
north lake were beautiful and fascinating) is
also obliterated.

All of the recreational advan-

tages of the north lake are gone.
4.

The causeway has operated as a dam and

has backed water onto Solar's land without its
permission.
5.

All of the above phenomena are directly

attributable to the SP's emplacement of its causeway.
6.

Solar has sustained special injury because

of the SP induced changes in the Great Salt Lake

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chemistry and destruction of the Great Salt
Lake ecosystem.

The lake at Solar's- plant

location represents a diminished and depleted
raw material source-

Solar has been placed

at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
other salt harvesters, and Solar's lands have
been flooded.
ISSUES OH APPEAL
The issue on appeal is simply whether the law of Utah
affords any relief to Solar in the fact situation stated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT'S. RULING IN MORTON*
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS CASE
In Morton, this court ruled that Morton Salt Company
(in circumstances similar to Solar's) did not state a cause
of action against the SP by merely alleging that the SP had
caused a redistribution of the lake's salt load unless it
also identified in its pleadings the source and nature of
Morton's right that some particular degree of salinity be
maintained.

Morton relied entirely on its diligence rights

to lake water, its royalty agreement with the State, and
the instrument (claimed to be a third party beneficiary
contract) by which the State granted to the SP a causeway

MORTON SALT COMPANY VS. SOUTHERN PACIFIC, 27 U2d 256, 435 P2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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easement.

None of these, said this court, conferred a

right which was violated by the mere dilution of or redistribution of solids in the lake brines.
Solar, in this action, does not rely on contractual
rights except to establish the value of its enterprise.
The rights Solar asserts are statutorily conferred.

For

the court's convenience, we will here identify and quote
the relevant language from the statutes on which we rely
(with emphasis, of course, added).
•73-14-2 (a) UCA 1953 as amended:
"Pollution means such . . . alteration
of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any waters of the state . . . as '
will . . . render such water harmfull or
detrimental or injurious to . . . domestic,
commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses,
or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish
or other aquatic life."
73-14-5 (a) UCA 1953 as amended:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
cause pollution as defined in Section 73-142(a) of any waters of the state. . . . Any
such action is hereby declared to be a public
nuisance."
78-38-1 UCA 1953 as amended:
"Anything which is . . . an obstruction
to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an
action. Such action may be brought by any
person whose property is injuriously affected,
or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance
may be enjoined or abated, and damages may
also be recovered."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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78-38-2' UGA 1953 as amended:
• *I"£ a guardian, tenant for life or
years, joint tenant or tenant in common,
of real property commits waste thereonF
any person aggrieved by the waste may
bring an action therefor, in which action
there may be a judgement for treble
damages*11
7 3-1-15 OCA 1953 as amended:1
"Whenever a person/ partnership, company or corporation has a right of way „, .
for any.. ..' * watercourse, it shall be
unlawful for any person, persons or governmental agencies to place or maintain in
place any obstruction, or change of the
waterflow by fence or otherwise, along
or across or in such . . . watercourse
• . • without first receiving written
persmission for the change and provide
gates sufficient for the passage of the
owner or owners of such . . . watercourse
. * . any person, partnership, company
or corporation, violating the provisions
of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and is subject to damages
and costs."

Solar relies not only on the statute but also on the venerable
doctrine of Utah law that an appropriator of water has a right
that the v/ater flow in its natural course without interruption.
The doctrine is well states in Wrathall vs. Johnson, 86 Utah
50, 40 P2d 755 as follows:
"Under both the common-law doctrine of
riparian right or ownership and the doctrine
of appropriation, one located nearer to the
source was not permitted to cut off or interrupt
or diminish or pollute the source. A right once
established upon a stream or source of supply
vested in the owner of such right an interest in
the stream to the the source. Cole & Thomas v.
Richards Irr. Co., 27 Utah 205, 7S P. 376, 101
Am. St. Rep. 962? Yates v. Newton, 59 Utah 105,
202 P. 208; Chandler"et a h v. Utah Copper Co.,
43 Utah 479, 135 P.~106. Such vested interest
is not an ownership of the corpus of the water
in the same sense as the ownership of land, and,
until the water is conducted into the canal,
reservoir, or other container belonging to the
appropriator, the right is that of use and to
have it flow to his place of use without interruption.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Not one of these statutes was cited by Morton, nor did
the court appear to consider them in rendering the Morton
decision.

Dilution alone may not give rise to a cause of

action, but it is a different matter to so change the lake
that aquatic life is destroyed, recreational values are
lost, and industrial water uses are impaired.
We will discuss the nature of private redress for
injury from public nuisance in a later section of this
brief.
POINT II
THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN
HARDY* IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF
THIS CASE
In Hardy, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals unquestionably upheld the Honorable Willis W. Ritter in his ruling
that Morton, despite the obvious fact that no public nuisance
issue was raised in it, precludes recovery by a private litigant for special damages suffered as a result of public
nuisance.

It is evident from the Hardy decision, we believe,

that the appellate court confirmed Judge Ritter with some
reluctance.

"The responsibility of the federal courts,

in matters of local law1', said Judge Holloway, "is not
to formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to
ascertain and apply it," and "the views of the resident
District Judge are persuasive and ordinarily accepted".
_

.

_-_____.

_____

HARDY SALT COMPANY VS. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO.,
501 F2d 1156.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- aIn this appeal proceeding, it is necessary that
Solar convince this court that Judge Ritter did not
comprehend "the legal mind of the state" in Hardy, and
that this Court did not intend in Morton to judicially
repeal the statutes we have above cited nor to reverse
its previous ruling that one who sustains, a special injury
from a public nuisance has direct resort to the judicial
system.
The circuit court did not, incidentally, affirm
Judge Ritter on the basis of any interpretation of the
facts with regard to pollution and public nuisance.

Indeed,

the decision assumes and almost proclaims that the pollution,
and public nuisance have been demonstrated.

On page 1164

of the Hardy decision, the court said:
"Thus, while the District Court made no
finding on the issue, the plaintiff's proof
was substantial that Southern Pacific has
caused pollution creating a public nuisance".
The views of this court need not, of course, conform
to those of the resident federal district judge even as
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The

"legal mind of the state" must be formulated by the statefs
judiciary.

While Hardy is relevant, it is in no sense- con-

trolling authority.

The editors of American Jurisprudence

have this to say on the subject:
"State Courts are not bound to follow a
decision of a federal court, even the United
States Supreme Court, dealing with state law.
Thus a state court is not bound to follow a
decision of a federal court, even the United
States Supreme Court, construing the constitution or a statute of that state". (20 Am Jur
556)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT III
ONE WHO CREATES AND MAINTAINS A
PUBLIC NUISANCE MUST RESPOND IN
DAMAGES TO PRIVATE CITIZENS WHO
SUSTAIN SPECIAL INJURY BY REASON
OF THE NUISANCE
The complaint here states a cause based upon Utah's
Water Pollution Act (the "Act") Title 73, Chapter 14, UCA
1953 as amended.

The Act became law in 1953, was effective

when the SP applied for its dike easement, and has been
effective at all times since.
The Act, in Section 2, defines pollution (deleting
language not relevant to this proceeding) as:
"Any . . . alteration of the physical,
chemical or biological properties of any
waters of this state as will . . . render such
waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to
. . . commercial, industrial . .•. recreational
or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to
. . . fish or other aquatic life."
The Act nowhere provides or suggests that, to constitute pollution, the "alteration" must result from any input of contaminant
substances.

It is simply the announced public policy to prevent

any activity which causes pollution as pollution is defined.
Besides defining pollution, the Act, in Section 73-14-5
(a), provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to
cause pollution . . . any such action is hereby declared to
be a public nuisance".

The complaint herein unquestionably

alleges that the SP has caused pollution and created a public
nuisance.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 10 The right of a private person to sue for special
damages resulting from a public nuisance has been frequently treated in texts and cases. There is Frothing
abstruse about the doctrine which has evolved.

A private

individual may sue for public nuisance if he can show
special injury, different in kind or, in some jurisdictions,
merely in degree from the injury suffered by the public
at large.

Perhaps as succinct as any textual statement

on the subject is the following from Corpus Juris Secundum,
Volume 66, Page 833:
§ 79. — N a t u r e and Extent of Special Injury
a. In general
b. Determination; particular Injuries
a.

I n General
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, i n
order to entitle an individual to relief against a public nuisance, it is essential that he show that he has
suffered or will suffer some specific injury other than
that in which the general public share alike.
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute t o
the contrary, it is essential co the right of a n individual to relief against a public nuisance that he should
show that he has suffered or will suffer some special
injury other than that in which^all the general public
share alike, and, as a general rule, within the limitations noted hereinafter, the difference between t h e
injury to him and the injury to the general public
must b e one of kind or character, and not merely of
degree. Such special injury must be established regardless of whether a statute or ordinance has b e e n
violated by defendant.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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T o the rule that a person damaged by a nuisance
cannot recover, if his damages be of the same character, as those sustained by the public, a limitation is
recognized where the particular nuisance is both a
public and a private one, and it has been held that in
such a case an action may be maintained by a n individual although many other persons may sustain like
injuries from the same nuisance; and it has also been
held that relief may be had by a private individual
against a public nuisance when the injury complained of is only greater in degree to complainant. T h e
rule requiring some injury peculiar to himself, a n d
differing in kind and degree from that suffered b y
the public generally, has been held to apply only t o
that class of nuisances which are, in strictness, p u b l i c
nuisances without more. It has been held that t h e
r u l e does not obtain where the nuisance, although
public from its extent and place, by its very existence
involves the invasion of the personal and p r i v a t e
rights of individuals; that with respect to the latter
class of nuisance an actionable w r o n g arises in favor
of all persons w h o come within the effects and i n fluence, and whose rights of personal property- a r e
injuriously affected; that in such case it is not r e quired, in order to sustain such action, that the person injured should establish damage differing in k i n d
and degree from others in like circumstances, h o w ever numerous they may be; and that the right of
action in such cases is sustained by showing the existence of an appreciable damage to plaintiff, w h e t h e r
such damage be special or otherwise.

Solar's injury here is, of course, different in kind
and degree from that suffered by the public at large.

Solar

has devoted a half century of effort, industry, research,
and investment to a business venture based upon the resource
which the Great Salt Lake represents in its natural state.
The general public has suffered no injury except (1) the
loss of lake values as some billion tons of halite has been
deposited on the bed of the north lake, and (2) the loss of
a public recreational resource as the north lake has become
almost totally necrotic.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The special injury which Solar has sustained is
adequately alleged in the complaint and is obvious from
the circumstances,

Solar invested heavily in plant designed

to extract the very mineral which the SP has rendered unrecoverable in the commission of statutory and common law
waste*

Solar has been put to great expenses in enlarging

and redesigning its plant in order to harvest from a public
mineral source which has been greatly diminished in value,
by the SP's maintenance of a public nuisance.
The Utah court very early considered a. situation
where a defendant was alleged to have created a public
nuisance by contaminating a watercourse from which the
plaintiffs had standing to sue by reason of special injury
resulting from the defendant's maintenance of a public
nuisance.

In that case (Northpoint Irrigation Company

vs. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, 16 U 246, 52 P 163)
the court was construing a different statute., one which
defined public nuisance generally, but it clearly declared
the right of a private citizen to seek relief from injury
attributable to public nuisance.
There are a great many cases, involving suits by
individuals against perpetrators of public nuisances,
where the injury complained of has been based upon some
property right lesser in quality than a fee interest in
real property.

We call the court's particular attention

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to J. RL Miles & Company vs. McLean Contracting Company,
180 F2d 789.

In that case, the plaintiff sued for damages

resulting from dredging operations which deposited silt
and mud on oyster beds from which the plaintiff had some
right, as a licensee from the state to harvest oysters.
That right, said the court, was a sufficient property
interest on which to support an action for damages but
which "we think we are not called upon to define specifically or fit into precise legal category".

The court

cited with approval the cases of Hampton vs. North Carolina Pulp Company, 27 SE2d 538 and 132 F2d 840, wherein
a riparian proprietor on a navigable river was held to
have status to sue an upstream polluter for injury to
fish in the river even though the plaintiff obviously
had no proprietary interest in the fish.
In Hampton, the court made this comment on the
public nuisance concept;
{4} " W e think our decision here finds some
support in the well settled rule that a private individual may sue on a public nuisance when h e can
show that he has, by virtue of this nuisance, sustained
damages to him of a special character, distinct a n d
different from the injury suffered by the public generally. See, 39 Am. J u r . § 124, pages 378 et seq.,
and the host of cases there cited,.particularly N o r t h ern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whalen, 149 U.S. 157,
13 S.Ct. 822, 37 L.Ed. 686; Northern Transportation
Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L.Ed. 336;
Sullivan v. American Manufacturing Co., 4 Cir., 33
F.2d 690; Henry v. City of Newburyport, 149 Mass.
5S2, 22 N.E. 75, 5 L.R.A. 179; Rhymer v. Fretz, 2 0 6
Pa. 230, 55 A. 959, 98 Am.St. Rep. 777; Meredith
v. Tiple Island G u n n i n g Club, 113 Va. 80, 73 SJE.
721, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 286, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 5 3 1 ;
Beveridge v. Lacey, 24 Va. 6 3 . Certainly Miles has
here sustained such special and distinct damage, a p a r t
fromDigitized
the injury
suffered
public/*
by the Howard
W. Hunterby
Lawthe
Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Maddox vs. International Paper Company, 4 7. F.
Supp. 829, 105 F. Supp* 89, 203 F2d 88, was a suit
brought on two occasions by the proprietor of a fishing
camp against a polluter of public waters,, Bodcau Bayou,
in Louisiana.

The pertinent holding of the case is

that the plaintiff? by virtue only of his having developed
a fishing camp on the shores of the Bayou, had the kind of
interest which would support an action against a polluter
of public waters.
Without reference to the public nuisance aspects
of the SPfs conduct here complained of, the changes in
the lake characteristics which have resulted from the
causeway constitute a private nuisance within the meaning
of the Utah statute identified in the complaint.

The

Tenth Circuit's ruling on this point is no more controlling
than its ruling on the public nuisance point.
POINT IV
SOLAR HAS STATUTORY STATUS TO SUE
BECAUSE THE SP'S USE OF THE PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO ITS EASEMENT CONSTITUTES
WASTE
Much of the confusion about the common law action
of waste is associated with determining who has the right
to maintain it.
understood.

The elements of the action are easily

Waste is the "destruction, misuse, alteration.,

or neglect of premises by one lawfully in. possession thereof

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the prejudice of the estate or interest therein of
another" (56 Am Jur 450, Waste Section 2).

As a matter

of evolution, the action was at first maintainable only
by one having an immediate estate of inheritance*

The

class of plaintiffs has been enlarged, however, by statute
and decision.

The concept persists that the kind of injury

which gives rise to the action is an injury to the reversion or inheritance.

That is, most jurisdictions require

proof that the owner of the basic fee estate will eventually
have restored to him a property which is intrinsically
diminished by the activity of the defendant (56 Am Jur
458).
The restriction of the plaintiff class to those
who have an estate of inheritance has been increasingly
criticized.

The New York Law Revision Commission, in

its 1935 report on this subject, stated what ought to be
the objective of the law of waste as follows:
"The law of waste is a part of the regulation of the relations between persons who
simultaneously have interests in the same
thing. Normally, one of these persons is
in possession and the others are out of
possession. Such a circumstance requires
that the one in possession be forbidden such
action as will diminish the market value of
the other interests, and that he be required
to act fairly in the maintenance of the
property."
The 1951 Utah Legislature, whether influenced by the
New York Commission's brand of thinking or not, enacted what
is codified as Section 78-38-2 UCA 1953, which provides:
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"If a guardian, tenant for life or years f
joint tenant, or tenant in common of real property commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved
by the waste may bring an action against him"
therefor, in which action there may be a judgment
for treble damages." (our emphasis)
In the instant case, we have a situation where the
parties and others simultaneously had interests in the Great
Salt Lake.

Certainly, the SP and the State of Utah had

simultaneous interests in the very land on which the dike
was installed.

The SP has used the lands for the purpose

contemplated by its easement but in a manner which has
unnecessarily and unreasonably diminished the value of
others! interests including the value of the estate of
inheritance or reversion.

While Solar does not hold the

estate of reversion, Solar is most particularly "aggrieved"
by the SP!s commission of waste.
POINT V
THE SP!S DAMMING OF THE LAKE SO
AS TO FLOOD SOLAR1S LAND IS ACTIONABLE
The complaint alleges that the causeway constitutes
a dam which has backed up the lake waters so that Solar's
lands, owned and leased, have been inundated or saved from
inundation at considerable expense.

The SP now asserts

that the situation, even if all the complaint*s allegations
on this score are true, does not give rise to a cause of
action.
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The general rule (in both riparian and desert
jurisdictions) is that "no one has the right to project
on adjoining lands, without the owner's consent, water
that would not otherwise have flowed thereon; and if he
does so, he may be held liable for an actionable wrong"
(78 Am Jur 2d 790).

The annotators cite some fourteen

cases in support of tie stated legal proposition, and we
are not aware that tha SP asserts a different one.

The

notion the SP appears co entertain is that its easement
from the state carried with it a right to flood the lands
on which south shore proprietors were conducting their
business, at least to the degree those lands are in state
ownership.
The instrument by which the state conveyed to the
SP a right to emplace its causeway does not expressly
include any right to flood or add to the water burden of
lake bed lands with regard to which lessees from the state
had prior rights.

If the SP obtained any rights, it must

have acquired them by implication.

We find no case where

the constructor of an obstruction within a public watercourse under a grant from a public agency has asserted
an implied right to flood riparian lands occupied by others
as lessees from the same public agency.

Courts have, however,

considered whether a grant of authority, even by a state
legislature, to build a bridge across a river authorizes
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the grantee to obstruct navigation.

The courts have

consistently held that a right to interfere with established uses is never implied*

See Commonwealth vs r

Charlestown, 18 Mass.'180/ State vs. Hutchings, 79 NH
132, 105 AtX. 519, 2ALR 1685*

In any event, Solar

contends that the burden is on the SP to establish
that its easement includes the right to flood stats
owned but previously leased lands.
CONCLUSION
The law throughout the nation has historically
been that a private citizen has standing in the courts
to seek abatement of a public nuisance which does him special
injury and to recover damages for that injury.

Not only did

Utah's decisional law so hold before Morton, but also Utah's
statutes have long been explicit.
While the federal district court for Utah has
ascertained the "legal mind of the state1' f as expressed
by Morton, to be that private citizens specially damaged
by public nuisance no longer have access to the courts#
we submit that the perception of the federal court was
erroneous, and Judge Hanson erred in treating Hardy as
controlling precedent.
That the SP should be allowed to maintain a
structure which has such enormous negative impact on
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a primary public asset is outrageous.

It is a sorry

judicial system indeed which will provide no remedy
for those who sustain direct and particular injury
for such nuisance.

*-£
Respectfully submitted this / ^ ^ day of April,
1976.
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FRANK J. ALLEN^'-Attorney for Appellant
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